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The recent West African Ebola virus pandemic, which affected >28,000 individuals 
increased interest in anti-Ebolavirus vaccination programs. Here, we systematically 
analyzed the requirements for a prophylactic vaccination program based on the basic 
reproductive number (R0, i.e., the number of secondary cases that result from an indi-
vidual infection). Published R0 values were determined by systematic literature research 
and ranged from 0.37 to 20. R0s ≥  4 realistically relected the critical early outbreak 
phases and superspreading events. Based on the R0, the herd immunity threshold (Ic) 
was calculated using the equation Ic = 1 − (1/R0). The critical vaccination coverage (Vc) 
needed to provide herd immunity was determined by including the vaccine effectiveness 
(E) using the equation Vc = Ic/E. At an R0 of 4, the Ic is 75% and at an E of 90%, more than 
80% of a population need to be vaccinated to establish herd immunity. Such vaccination 
rates are currently unrealistic because of resistance against vaccinations, inancial/
logistical challenges, and a lack of vaccines that provide long-term protection against all 
human-pathogenic Ebolaviruses. Hence, outbreak management will for the foreseeable 
future depend on surveillance and case isolation. Clinical vaccine candidates are only 
available for Ebola viruses. Their use will need to be focused on health-care workers, 
potentially in combination with ring vaccination approaches.
Keywords: ebola virus, ebolavirus, vaccines, herd immunity, basic reproduction number
inTrODUcTiOn
he genus Ebolavirus contains ive species: Zaire ebolavirus (type virus: Ebola virus), Sudan ebolavirus 
(type virus: Sudan virus), Bundibugyo ebolavirus (type virus: Bundibugyo virus), Taï Forest ebolavirus 
(type virus: Taï Forest virus, previously also referred to by names such as Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus or 
Ivory Coast ebolavirus), Reston ebolavirus (type virus: Reston virus) (1). Four Ebolaviruses (Ebola 
virus, Sudan virus, Bundibugyo virus, Taï Forrest virus) are endemic to Africa and can cause severe 
disease in humans (2). Reston viruses are endemic to Asia and considered to be non-pathogenic in 
humans (2). However, very few genetic changes may result in human-pathogenic Reston viruses 
(2–4). Since the discovery of the irst two members of the Ebolavirus family in 1976 in Sudan (today 
South Sudan) and Zaïre (today Democratic Republic of Congo), Ebolaviruses had until 2013 only 
caused small outbreaks in humans afecting up to a few 100 individuals (5, 6). he recent Ebola 
virus outbreak in West Africa (2013–2016) resulted in 28,616 conirmed, probable, and suspected 
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cases of Ebola virus disease and 11,310 deaths (6), which may still 
underestimate the actual numbers (7). It was the irst Ebolavirus 
outbreak that afected multiple countries, was introduced to 
another country via air travel, and resulted in a signiicant number 
of human disease cases outside of Africa (5, 6). Prior to this out-
break, only isolated human cases were treated outside of Africa. 
A scientist who had become infected by Taï Forest virus ater an 
autopsy of a Chimpanzee was treated in Switzerland (8), and two 
laboratory infections were reported in Russia (9, 10). In addition, 
Reston virus-infected non-human primates were exported from 
the Philippines to the US and Italy (11). Finally, Marburg virus 
(which belongs like the Ebolaviruses to the Filoviruses) was 
exported out of Africa (12, 13) and was associated with labora-
tory infections (14, 15). Due to its unique size, the West African 
Ebolavirus outbreak emphasized the health threats posed by 
Ebolaviruses and the importance of protection strategies (6, 7).
Vaccination programs are efective in controlling infectious dis-
eases, as demonstrated by the WHO-driven smallpox eradication 
(16). However, eradication is likely to be more di cult for zoonotic 
viruses like the Ebolaviruses that circulate in animal reservoirs (17). 
Only herd immunity could prevent future outbreaks and protect 
individuals that cannot be vaccinated due to health issues (16). 
he herd immunity threshold (lc) describes the number of society 
members that need to be protected (18) to prevent outbreaks. It is 
based on the basic reproductive number R0 (number of secondary 
cases caused per primary case) of a pathogen (18–22).
Here, we performed a systematic analysis to determine the 
critical vaccine coverage (Vc) required to prevent Ebolavirus 
outbreaks by a prophylactic mass vaccination program based on 
the R0 associated with Ebolavirus infection in humans. he results 
were further critically considered in the context of (1) the status 
of current Ebolavirus vaccine candidates and (2) the feasibility of 
a large-scale prophylactic Ebolavirus vaccination program taking 
into account (a) the preparedness to participate in vaccination pro-
grams in the afected societies, (b) logistic challenges, and (c) costs.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
identiication of studies That report on 
the Basic reproductive number (R0) of 
ebolaviruses
To identify scientiic articles that have calculated the basic repro-
ductive number (R0) for Ebolaviruses, we performed a literature 
search using PubMed (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) for the 
search term combinations “Ebola R0,” “Ebola basic reproductive 
number,” and “Ebola basic reproduction number” (retrieved on 
29th September 2017).
Determination of herd immunity 
Thresholds and Their implications for 
ebolavirus Diseases Prevention strategies
Based on the basic reproductive number R0, i.e., the number of 
secondary cases that result from an individual infection, the herd 
immunity threshold (Ic) was calculated using Eq. 1.
 I Rc = − / 01 1( )  (1)
where Ic indicates the proportion of a society that needs to be 
protected from infection to achieve herd immunity. Next, the 
critical vaccination coverage (Vc) that is needed to provide herd 
immunity was determined by including the vaccine efectiveness 
(E) using Eq. 2 (18–22).
 V I E R Ec c 1 1= ( ) / = − / /0  (2)
resUlTs
Basic reproductive number (R0) Values for 
ebolaviruses
he PubMed search for “Ebola R0” provided 18 hits, the search 
for “Ebola basic reproductive number” provided 42 hits, and 
the search for “Ebola basic reproduction number” provided 35 
hits (Figure 1; Data Sheet S1 in Supplementary Material). Ater 
removal of the overlaps and inclusion of an additional article 
[identiied from the reference list of Ref. (21)], this resulted in 51 
articles, 35 of which provided relevant information on Ebolavirus 
R0 values (Figure 1; Data Sheet S1 in Supplementary Material).
R0 data were only available for Ebola virus and Sudan virus 
outbreaks (Data Sheet S1 in Supplementary Material). 29/35 
studies analyzed data from the recent West African Ebola virus 
outbreak (Data Sheet S1 in Supplementary Material). he others 
reported on Ebola virus outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Four studies also included data from the Sudan virus out-
break 2000/2001 in Gulu, Uganda. We also considered a review 
that summarized all available data until February 2015 (5) (Data 
Sheet S1 in Supplementary Material).
R0 indicates the number of new infections caused by an infected 
individual, and when greater than 1, an outbreak will spread. 
Diferent approaches to calculate R0s lead to varying results (22). 
Accordantly, R0 values calculated for the Sudan virus outbreak 
2000/2001 in Gulu using identical data ranged from 1.34 to 3.54 
(Data Sheets S1 and S2 in Supplementary Material). Small out-
break sizes may also limit the accuracy of the calculated R0 values. 
Additionally, virus transmission is inluenced by socioeconomic 
and behavioral factors including the health-care response, soci-
ety perceptions, religious practices, population density, and/or 
infrastructure (22, 23). Concordantly, R0s that were determined 
by the same methodology in diferent districts of Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone during the West African Ebola virus epidemic 
ranged from 0.36 to 3.37 (24). hree studies directly compared 
the Ebola virus outbreak in Kikwit (1995, DR Congo) and the 
Sudan virus outbreak in Gulu (2000/2001, Uganda) (25–27), 
but did not reveal fundamental diferences between the R0s of 
the viruses (Data Sheets S1 and S2 in Supplementary Material). 
Across all relevant studies, R0s ranged from 0.36 to 12 for Ebola 
virus and from 1.34 to 3.54 for Sudan virus (Data Sheet S1 in 
Supplementary Material). 9 of the 35 studies that provided R0 val-
ues showed that Ebola viruses can spread with an R0 > 3, and ive 
studies suggested that Ebolaviruses can spread with R0 values > 4. 
High reproductive numbers (≥4) are typically observed at the 
beginning of Ebolavirus outbreaks, prior to the implementation 
of control measures (28–31). Also, the spread of Ebolaviruses 
may be substantially driven by “superspreaders” who infect a high 
number (up to 15–20) of individuals (23, 32–35). Studies from 
FigUre 1 | Summary of the literature search using PubMed (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) to identify articles that report on the basic reproductive number (R0)  
of Ebolaviruses.
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the West African Ebola virus outbreak suggested that relatively 
small numbers of superspreaders may have been responsible for 
the majority of cases (35, 36). Since the available data suggest that 
Ebolavirus transmission can occur with R0 values of 3, 4, or even 
higher, a prophylactic vaccination program should establish herd 
immunity against Ebolaviruses that spread at such levels.
herd immunity Threshold (Ic)
At an R0 of 3, the Ic (Eq. 1) is 67%, which means that 67% of a popu-
lation need to be immune to provide herd immunity (Figure 2A; 
Data Sheet S3 in Supplementary Material). he Ic further rises 
to 75% at an R0 of 4, to 80% at an R0 of 5, to 90% at an R0 of 10, 
and to 95% R0 of 20 (Figure 2A; Data Sheet S3 in Supplementary 
Material). his shows that high proportions of a population need 
to be immune to establish efective herd immunity.
critical Vaccine coverage (Vc)
As there is currently no approved vaccine for the prevention of 
Ebolavirus disease, we calculated a range of Vc (Eq. 2) scenarios 
that relect the eicacy range covered by approved vaccines. 
Attenuated replication-competent measles virus vaccines have 
been reported to protect up to 95% of individuals from disease 
ater one dose, which increased to up to 99% ater a second dose 
(37). he eicacy of varicella zoster virus vaccines, another attenu-
ated replication-competent vaccine, was recently calculated to be 
81.9% ater one dose and 94.4% ater two doses (38). Inactivated 
seasonal inluenza virus split vaccines have been reported to have 
a substantially lower eiciency of 50–60% (39–41). Hence, we 
considered a Vc range between 50 and 100% (Figure  2B; Data 
Sheet S3 in Supplementary Material). Vaccines, which provide 
high protection (ideally ater a single vaccination), and high vac-
cination rates are required for prophylactic vaccination programs 
that establish a level of herd immunity that prevents Ebolavirus 
outbreaks. If we assume an R0 of 3 and a vaccination eicacy E 
of 90%, more than 70% of a population need to be vaccinated to 
establish herd immunity. At an R0 of 4 and a vaccination eicacy 
E of 90%, more than 80% of a population need to be vaccinated. 
If the R0 rises to 5, a vaccine coverage of 80% would be required, 
even if a vaccine with 100% eicacy was available (Figure  2B; 
Data Sheet S3 in Supplementary Material).
DiscUssiOn
We performed an analysis of the Ebolavirus vaccine requirements 
to achieve the Vc needed for prophylactic mass vaccination pro-
grams. A number of studies suggested that Ebolavirus transmis-
sion can occur with R0 values of 3, 4, or even higher, in particular 
during early outbreak stages (prior to the implementation of con-
trol measures) and/or as consequence of superspreading events 
(23, 24, 28–36). herefore, a prophylactic vaccination program 
should establish herd immunity against Ebolaviruses that spread 
at such levels. At an R0 of 3, >70% of individuals and at an R0 of 
4, >80% of individuals need to be vaccinated with a vaccination 
eicacy of 90% to achieve herd immunity. Hence, highly efective 
vaccines and a high vaccination coverage are essential for success-
ful prophylactic mass vaccination programs against Ebolaviruses.
FigUre 2 | Herd immunity thresholds (Ic) and critical vaccine coverage (Vc) 
values in dependence of the basic reproductive number (R0) and the vaccine 
eficacy (E). (a) Ic values based on a range of R0 values that cover the range 
reported for Ebola viruses. (B) Vc values based on R0 values that cover the 
range reported for Ebola viruses and E values that are in the range of those 
reported for approved vaccines. The respective numerical data are presented 
in Data Sheet S3 in Supplementary Material.
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Clinical vaccine candidates providing protection against 
all three to four human-pathogenic Ebolaviruses (Ebola virus, 
Sudan virus, Bundibugyo virus, potentially Taï Forest virus) do 
not currently exist (Data Sheet S4 in Supplementary Material), 
although preclinical data suggest that the development of such 
vaccines may be feasible (6). Current vaccine candidates may 
also not provide the long-term protective immunity (≥10 years) 
necessary for sustainable protection against spillover events 
from animal reservoirs. Two studies reported immune responses 
12  months ater vaccination with diferent Ebola virus vaccine 
candidates (42, 43). One of them described seroconversion in 
>90% of individuals ater a single injection of rVSV-ZEBOV, a 
vesicular stomatitis virus-based Ebola virus vaccine. No or only 
a minor drop in antibody titers and neutralization capacity was 
reported 360  days ater vaccination (42). A study investigating 
rVSV-ZEBOV and ChAd3-EBO-Z, a chimpanzee adenovirus 
type-3 vector-based Ebola virus vaccine, found lower serocon-
version rates (rVSV-ZEBOV: 83.7%; ChAd3-EBO-Z: 70.8%) 
and reported the highest antibody response ater 1 month and a 
decline aterward (43). hus, it is not clear, whether the vaccine-
induced immunity covers the time frame of 2 years (or perhaps 
even longer) that Ebolavirus survivors may remain contagious 
for (6, 42–52). It is also not clear whether (and if yes, to which 
extent) immunity to Ebolaviruses is mediated by cell-mediated 
and/or humoral immune responses (53). A challenge study using 
non-human primates suggested that protection by adenovirus-
based vaccines is cell mediated (54). his means that antigen 
binding and/or neutralization titers may not always correlate 
with protection from disease. Consequently, the eicacy levels of 
vaccines cannot be determined with certainty based on antibody 
responses at various time points post vaccination. hus, it remains 
unknown whether current vaccine candidates ofer the long-term 
protection necessary for mass vaccination programs that efec-
tively prevent zoonotic Ebolavirus outbreaks. Ebola virus recur-
rences and reinfections indicate that, although natural Ebolavirus 
infections are generally assumed to provide long-term protection, 
natural infections may not always result in sustained protective 
immunity in every survivor, which may further complicate the 
development of vaccines that provide long-term protection (55, 
56). In this context, the establishment of long-term immunity 
may be inluenced by the disease treatment. In a case of relapse 
9 months ater discharge, it was speculated whether the treatment 
of the initial disease with convalescent plasma and monoclonal 
antibodies might have contributed to the recurrence (55).
Limited acceptance of vaccinations may also limit Ebolavirus 
vaccination programs. In a rVSV-ZEBOV ring vaccination trial, 
only 5,837/11,841 patient contacts could be vaccinated. 34% of 
the contacts refused the vaccination (57). In a survey in Sierra 
Leone during the West African Ebola epidemic, 106/400 respond-
ents (26.6%) were prepared to pay for a vaccination, while 290 
respondents (72.5%) would have accepted a free vaccination (58). 
Since 74% of the population need to be vaccinated by a vaccine 
with a 90% eicacy to prevent an outbreak that spreads with an 
R0 of 3 and 83% of the population to prevent an outbreak that 
spreads with an R0 of 4 (Data Sheet S3 in Supplementary Material), 
such levels of vaccine coverage seem currently unachievable, even 
under the threat of an ongoing epidemic, although attitudes may 
change in the future if more (clinical) data becomes available. 
herefore, more diferentiated vaccination strategies with a focus 
on health-care workers and patient contacts appear more feasible.
he median maximum fee that survey participants in Sierra 
Leone during the West African Ebola epidemic were prepared to 
pay for a vaccine was about 5,000 leones ($0.65 as of 11th January 
2018) (58). he international organization GAVI (www.gavi.org) 
is providing $5 million for the development of rVSV-ZEBOV, 
which is expected to pay for 300,000 vaccine doses (about 
$16.70/dose) (59). Within a rVSV-ZEBOV ring vaccination trial, 
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11,841 contacts requiring vaccination from 117 clusters were 
identiied over a 10-month period, i.e., about 101 individuals 
per conirmed Ebola virus disease patient (57). Hence, 300,000 
doses will enable vaccination of the contacts of approximately 
2,970 Ebola virus disease patients. If an efective vaccine (which 
provided protection against all human-pathogenic Ebolaviruses) 
was available, a vaccination program would comprise about 462 
million individuals in the countries that have been afected by 
Ebolavirus outbreaks (Data Sheet S5 in Supplementary Material). 
Notably, the countries, which have been afected by Ebolavirus 
outbreaks so far, have large rural populations ranging from 13% 
(Gabon) to 84% (Uganda) (Data Sheet S5 in Supplementary 
Material). Vaccination programs in rural areas are associated 
with logistical issues including transport diiculties, lack of 
equipment and trained medical specialists, and cultural and 
language barriers (60, 61).
In conclusion, the achievement of a Vc of 75% that is neces-
sary to prevent an outbreak that spreads with an R0 of 4 with 
a vaccine that has an eicacy of 100% is currently unrealistic 
because of limited vaccine acceptance in the afected populations 
and because of inancial and logistical challenges. In addition, 
concurrent diseases such as HIV and cancer, along with potential 
side efects of vaccination, may remove signiicant numbers of 
potential vaccines (6, 62). Alternative vaccination strategies will 
be required for such patients. Replication-deicient vaccines such 
as DNA vaccines, virus-like particles, nanoparticle-based vac-
cines, and viral vectors (e.g., Modiied Vaccinia Ankara, which 
was already demonstrated to be safe in immunocompromised 
individuals) may be safer alternatives (6, 63). Moreover, vaccines 
that provide long-term immunity against all three (or including 
Taï Forest virus, four) human-pathogenic Ebolaviruses, which 
would be needed to protect populations efectively from large 
Ebolavirus outbreaks in endemic areas, do not exist. herefore, 
outbreak control of Ebolaviruses will for the foreseeable future 
depend on surveillance and the isolation of cases. Clinical vac-
cine candidates are only available for Ebola viruses and will need 
to be focused on health-care workers, who are oten involved in 
disease transmission (30), potentially in combination with the 
vaccination of patient contacts. Hence, our indings support the 
conclusions of the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts 
on immunization (SAGE) at the WHO SAGE meeting on 25th 
to 27th April 2017 (64). SAGE acknowledged the need for 
further research on Ebolavirus vaccines, including the genera-
tion of conclusive data on the duration of protection provided 
by Ebolavirus vaccine candidates. In case of future Ebolavirus 
outbreaks, SAGE recommended the use of rVSV-ZEBOV ring 
vaccination strategies (64).
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